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FIRST DAY FIRST SECTION 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia June 29-30, 1970 
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~ 1. Tom Ritter and his wife, Peggy, are residents of 
Galax, in Grayson County, Virginia. Tom was the owner of a 
Cadillac automobile which he maintained for the use of himself 
and the members of his family. Peggy was quite a golf enthusiast 
and frequently drove to Blowing Rock, North Carolina, to play the 
High Meadows course. While drivinghome in the Cadillac after an 
afternoon of golf, at the entrance to the High Meadows Golf Club, 
Peggy negligently collided with an automobile being driven by 
, tJ Henry Fortune, resulting in injuries to Fort1:lne. 
: 1'il<ii ~ --(;v The State of North Carolina recognizes the family purpose 
doctrine pertaining to the use of automobiles, but Virginia does 
not recognize such doctrine. 
Fortune instituted a. civil action against Tom Ritter in 
Circuit Court 1.Jf Grayson County, Virginia, to -recover damages 
his injuries. q !) ~ . ..--'. 
Is Fortune entitled to recover for his {,() ... .,/~ . 
injuries against T~ Ritter. ? C> r ... .v t.1 -
<'I I <)<? ~ 'b "1 (.A Y'v '( s 
2. In 1968 the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, 
Virginia, granted W an absolute divorce from H and custody of 
their three children. The decree also required H to pay W $300 
a month for the support of their children. After proper notice 
to W, H lodged in the Clerk's Office of the same court a petition 
on December 1, 1969, in which he sought a reduction in the amount 
of support money he was paying for the children. On the same 
day a consent order was entered reinstating the cause on the 
docket, permitting H to file his petition, and giving W 15 days 
within which to answer the petition. She failed to answer it .. 
- On January 15, 1970, the Chancellor entered a decree re-
ducing the monthly payments from $300 to $200. The decree, 
however, had not been endorsed by counsel for W, nor had W or her 
counsel been notified of the time and place of its presentation 
for entry. On February 10, 1970, counsel for W, who had just 
heard of the entry of the decree of January 15th, notified counsel 
for H that on March 5th W would move for the entry of an order 
vacating the decree of January 15th on the ground that it had 
been improvidently entered and without compliance with the. Rules 
of Court. 
On March 5th, after an ~ tenus hearing on this motion, 
the lower court entered a decree refusing to vacate its decree of 
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January 15, 1970. On May 1, 1970, W to6k the steps required by 
statute and the Rules of Court to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals from the decree of March 5, 1970. On the appeal, W assigned 
as error the action of the lower court in declining by its decree 
of March 5th to vacate its decree of January 15th, which decree of 
January 15th she alleged was void because of the failure of the 
lower court to ha~e complied with the Rules of Court. The Supreme 
court of Appeals granted the appeal. 
After the appeal had been granted, H, by proper motion, 
moved that it be dismissed as having been improvidently awarded 
because: 
(A) The decree of January 15, 1970, had become 
(B) 
final before W sought to have it vacated and, there-
fore, it was not subject to being vacated; and 
The appeal came too late because it was an attack 
on the decree of January 15, 1970, and the appeal 
from that decree was not perfected within the time 
prescribed by statute and the Rules of Court. 
How ought the Supreme Court of Appeals to 
rule on each of these contentions? 
3. Smith and Jones owned adjoining farms in Page County, 
Virginia. Smith instituted a chancery suit against Jones in the 
Circuit Court of Page County to enjoin him from using a road through 
Smith's farm to reach a State secondary road. Jones filed an answer 
in which he claimed the legal right to continue to use the road 
across Smith's farm. After depositions had been taken, the 
Chancellor entered a final decree on March 2, 1970, in which he held 
that Jones had no legal right to use the road and Jones and all 
others claiming under him were enjoined from using said road. 
Jones did not seek an appeal from said decree, but on June 
22, 1970, he consults you. At that time he states that since the 
Court's decree of March 2nd was entered he has discovered new 
evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been · 
discovered before and that it is of so material a nature that if 
previously brought to the attention of the Court its introduction 
would probably have altered the result. He inquires of you what, 
if anything, may now be done to secure a reversal of the decree 
of March 2nd. 
Assuming that he satisfies you that he can 
meet the requirements of the "newly discovered 
evidence rule", how ought you to advise him? 
Rufus Carter comes to your office and shows you the 
motion for judgment, with notice attached, which has just 
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been served upon him by the Sheriff of the City of Richmond~ 
11Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the 
City of Richmond 




1019 Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia, 
Defendant 
Motion for Judgment 
"The plaintiff is an infant nineteen years of age who, 
while crossing the intersection of 8th and Grace Streets in the 
City of Richmond on the afternoon of May 26, 1970, was negligently 
struck by an automobile then driven by the defendant, all to the 
plaintiff's damage in the sum of $5,000; and on June 15, 1970, 
while the plaintiff was hospitalized as a result of the defendant's 
negligence heretofore recited~ defendant a.greed to purchase from the 
plaintiff his sailboat named 'Daisy May 11 for the price of $500, 
and the defendant now refuses to make such purchase, all to the 
plaintiff's damage in the sum of $250. _ 
11WHEREFORE, the plaintiff moves for judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $5,250. 
"Is/ Ben Barrister 
Counsel for Plaintiff 11 
11 /s/ John Bird 
Plaintiff 
Rufus Carter now asks you in what respects, if any, this 
motion for judgment is defective. 
What should your answer be? 
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5. Philip Vogel, a resident of the City of Washington, has 
brought an action in the Alexandria Division of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Dr. Earl 
Hall and Dr. William Jones, individually and a.s partners doing 
business as "Hall and Jones". The complaint seeks da.mages of 
$50,000 for alleged negligence causing injuries to Vogel while 
being operated on by Dr. Hall in the City of Alexandria. The 
complaint further alleges that Dr. Hall and Dr. Jones are residents 
of the City of Alexandria. The two defendants have now moved that 
the action be dismissed for lack of diversity of citizenship, and 
with their motion have filed the affidavit of Dr. Hall which admits 
that he and Dr. Jones are partners, admits that Dr. Jones is a 
resident of Virginia, but asserts that he {Dr. Hall) is a resident 
of the City of Washington. Vogel now consults you and tells you 
that he has learned that the affidavit is a correct recital of 
facts, but that, for compelling reasons, he does not wish to proceed 
in a State court. He then asks you (a) what he may do to prevent 
dismissal of the action; and (b) whether he may retain a good cause 
of action in the District Court. 
~/) y1-~. 
')' p_;.f 6. Susa,n Howard, a young lady of the City of Richmond, one 
What should your advice be? 
afternoon went into a second-hand book store operated by Timothy 
Haven as sole proprietor. While browsing in the store, she ca.me 
across a book that had written in longhand on its flyleaf "Thomas 
Jefferson". She at once showed the book to Haven a.nd asked whether 
the book had belonged to Mr. Jefferson and, if so, its price .. 
Haven replied that the book had been the property of Thomas 
Jefferson, that the signature was genuine, and that the price was 
$500. Miss Howard thereupon paid the price by check, took the book, 
and left the store. Several months later Miss Howard learned from 
an expert in such matters that the book had never been the property 
of Thomas Jefferson, and that his apparent signature was a forgery. 
She then brought an action against Haven in the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond alle~ing fraud on his part, seeking 
$500 for compensatory damages and $1,000 for punitive damages, and 
tendered the book into the Clerk's Office of the Court. On the 
trial of the case, Miss Howard proved her purchase of the book and 
the attending representation by Hav·en and its falsity. Haven 
then testified that he had purchased the book from a reputable 
dealer in New York City on whom he had relied. He then offered 
in evidence a written warranty which had been given him by the 
dealer at the time of his purchase, which warranty described the 
book as one having been owned and signed by Thomas Jefferson. Miss 
Howard objected to the admissibility of the written warranty on 
the ground that it was hearsay. 
Was the written warranty admissible 
in evidence? 
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7. Henry Pike was on trial in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Petersburg for grand larceny of an automobile owned by 
Tom Moody. Pike defended the charge on a plea of "Not Guilty". 
When called as a witness for the Commonwealth, Moody testified: 
"Q. State what happened when you learned your auto-
mobile had been stolen. 
"A. I was told by a person who had been in the parking 
lot at the time my car was stolen that he had seen 
Henry Pike drive it away. I then got my.friend Tom 
Stokes to go with me to Pike's home and rang the 
cIOOrcell. When Pike came to the front door, I looked 
at him and said to Stokes 'That is the thief. He's 
the man who stole my automobile. ' 
"Q. Did Pike hear you say that? 
11A. He sure did. 
"Q. What did Pike say? 
11A. He didn't say anything at all. After a few minutes,, 
Stokes and I left and went to the pol.ice station, 
and I had a warrant issued for the arrest of Pike. 
On the same afternoon, Pike was arrested." · 
Pike did not testify in his own defense. At the conclusion of the 
evidence, the Commonwealth's Attorney asked the Court to instruct 
the jury: 
"The Court instructs the jury that, if you believe 
from the evidence, the defendant Pike did not deny 
what was stated to him by Tom Moody in accusing him of 
theft prior to the time .of Pike's arrest, then you 
may treat such failure to deny as an acquiescence by 
Pike of the truth of the statement made by Moody, and 
an implied.admission by Pike of his guilt. 11 
Counsel for Pike objected to this instruction on the ground that 
it was highly prejudicial and violated the hearsay evidence rule. 
Should the instruction have been given? 
8. John Bond was on trial for first degree murder in the 
Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. During the course of 
:.\ the trial, and on the motion of the Commonweal th' s Attorney, the 
· ···· Judge ordered a view. by the jury, to be accompanied by the Judge 
and by the Sheriff-;-'for the purpose of seeing the premises where · 
the murder was alleged to have been committed. After so in-
s.tructing the jury, the Judge said to counsel for Bond "Would you 
e.nd Mr. Bond care to go with the jury on its view?" After a brief 
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discussion with Bond, his counsel replied "No, Your Honor. We 
would prefer to stay here a.nd discuss additional evidence which 
we may wish to bring into the case. 11 The jury then proceeded on its 
view. After the jury 1 s return, and after all evidence was in, the 
jury retired and returned with a verdict finding Bond guilty of 
murder in the second degree. Thereupon, counsel for Bond moved the 
Court to set aside the verdict contending that it was reversible 
error for the Court to have permitted the jury to undertake its 
view without Bond being then present. The Commonwealth's Attorney 
denied that the Court had committed reversible error and contended 
that, even conceding the contrary, Bond had waived the error by 
declining to accompany the jury on its view. 
How should the Court rule (a) on the contention 
of counsel for Bond, and (b) on the contention of the 
Commonwealth's Attorney? 
9. Good Boy Hamburger's, Inc., leased from Alnert West a 
vacant lot in the City of Richmond for a term of five years, 
such term to expire on June 1, 1970. The written lease provided, 
among other things, that Good Boy could build on the lot a vending 
shop from which it could sell hamburgers and other foods to the 
visiting public. It was also provided in the lease that any shop 
so built would remain the personal property of Good Boy, and could 
be removed on the expiration of the lease. As soon as the lease 
was executed by the parties, Good Boy constructed of red brick on 
the property a.n attractive vending shop. By the Spring of 1970, 
West had embarked on a business venture in competition with th?.t of 
Good Boy; and he refused to renew Good Boy's lease. Good Boy was 
forced to vacate the lot on June 1st, and West refused to permit it 
to tear down and remove the vending shop. The President of Good 
Boy now consults you and tells you the foregoing facts. He then 
asks on what ground for relief in an action at law should Good Boy 
proceed in order to recover maximum damages from West. 
What should your answer be? 
10. John Pitt was the owner of ten acres of valuable land 
in Chesterfield County which he wished developed. In May of 1970 . 
'. Barney Trapp, knowing of Pitt 1 s wishes, approached him and proposed 
\;( tha.t Pitt convey the land to Trapp for $45, 000, that he (Trapp) 
't:'t>lould construct thereon a large warehouse at a cost of $100, 000, 
,, 'a,nd that he would then lease the property back to Pitt for a term 
?f fifty years at an annual rental of $3,500. Pitt, feeling that 
f'.3\lch a plan would provide him certain tax advantages, accepted 
rapp•s proposal which was then reduced to writing and signed by 
oth parties, but was not recorded. On June 10th, on receipt of 
45,000, Pitt executed an appropriate deed conveying the land to 
rapp in fee simple. The deed, which was promptly recorded, made 
reference to the agreement between Pitt and Trapp. Pitt has now 
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obtained information which proves that Trapp fraudulently induced 
him to enter into the agreement and to deliver the deed,, that 
Trapp never intended to build the warehouse,, and that Trapp had as 
his sole aim a re-sale of the undeveloped property for $80,000. 
Pitt asks you to specify all the forms of remedy (a) at law, and 
(b) in equity, he has against Trapp because of his misconduct. 
What should you so specify? 
FIRST DAY SECTION TWO 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - June 29-30, 1970 
t·''\ 
~pl ' 
(f6. 1. Adams, acting without authority, purported to sell Paul's 
tractor to Terry. Pa.ul thereafter, on being informed of the 
facts, told Terry that he approved and ratified the acts of Adams. 
Subsequently, Pa.ul refused to perform and, when he was sued by 
Terry, defended on the ground that there was no consideration for 
the approval and ratification. 
Is this a good defense? /,/ () 
2. John Rash and his friend, Tom Terry, decided to attend 
some boat races which were scheduled to be held on Claytor Lake in 
Pulaski County on a given Sunday afternoon. It was agreed that 
Rash would stop by Terry's home in Dublin at 11: 00 a.m. on the 
day of the scheduled races and the two would proceed to Claytor 
Lake in the former' s automobile. Upon a.rriving at the Terry home, 
Jack Terry, an older brother of Tom's, expressed a desire to 
a.ccompany them on the trip. Jack Terry was a person of low 
mentality, who was capable of performing only the simplest of tasks, 
a.lthough he was not insane and no guardian or committee had ever 
been appointed to care for either his person or property. 
As the three were leaving the Terry home to enter Rash's auto-
mobile, it became apparent that Rash was intoxicated, and Tom 
Terry suggested that he do the driving. Rash insisted upon 
. <\~;riving, however, and the three entered the a.utomobile and proceed-
, >.ed toward Claytor Lake with Rash as the driver. On the way Rash 
'~:'s2·drove the a.utomobile at an excessive rate of speed and passed one 
~ruck, crossing a double yellow line as the two vehicles were 
;f.PProaching the crest of a hill. Shortly thereafter Rash stopped 
.F a wayside tavern where he ordered and consumed three beers. 
,~:fore proceeding further, Tom Terry a.gain requested Rash to permit 
m.to drive, but when the request was refused, the three re-entered 
e automobile and proceeded toward Glaytor Lake. Shortly there-
er Rash lost control of the car as he attempted to maneuver a 
Ve at an excessive rate of speed, with the result that the car 
t the road and went over an embankment, killing Jack Terry • 
.•... · Shortly thereafter Jack Terry's administrator brought an action 
.inst Rash in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County seeking damages 
the wrongful death of his decedent due to the gross negligence 
Rash. When the foregoing facts had been proven at the trial 
~he case, Rash's attorney moved the Court to strike the plain-
.i:'s evidence and enter summary judgment in his behalf on the 
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grounds that the evidence showed as a matter of law that Jack 
Terry had been guilty of contributory negligence and that he had 
also assumed the risk, either of which barred a recovery. In 
opposing the motion plaintiff's attorney argued that Jack Terry 
lacked the mental capacity and alertness of mind to recognize 
danger or peril or to properly appraise the manner in which Rash 
had been operating the automobile. 
What should be the Court's ruling on the 
motion? 
3. Ace Construction Company had a contract for the construction 
of a service station for Ample Oil Company on the latter's property 
in Big Stone Gap. As a. part of its work, Ace Construction Compa.ny 
dug a trench ·from the service station building to the street for 
the sewer line which was to serve the service station. In order to 
get the proper grade on the sewer line, it was necessary to dig the 
trench to a. depth ranging from six to ten feet. Although children 
played on the adjoining lot, the construction company did not erect 
any barriers at the sides of the trench, and permitted the same to 
lie open for several days while it waited for delivery of the pipe. 
During this period an unusually heavy rain occurred with the result 
that four feet of surface water gathered in the bottom of the trench. 
While the forego~ng conditions were in existence, Clyde Whitt hap-
pened to b.e passing by the service station lot and observed a four-
year old child fall into the trench at a point where it was appr.oxi- / 
mately ten feet deep. Whitt immediately rushed to the place where 
he had seen the child disappear into the ditch, and seeing the 
child in danger of drowning at the bottom of the trench, lowered 
himself into the trench in an effort to rescue the child. ··While 
doing so the dirt which had been taken from the trench and piled on 
the side thereof gave wa.y, slipped into the trench, suffoca.ting 
both the child and Whitt, with the result that both were killed. 
Whitt's widow qualified as administratrix of his estate, and 
brought an action against Ace Construction Company in the Circuit 
Court of Wise County, seeking damages for the alleged wrongful 
dea.th of her husband. At the trial of the case, after plaintiff 
;ha.d proven the foregoing facts, Ace Construction Company's attor-
.neys moved the Court to strike her evidence and grant summary 
judgment in its behalf for the reason that plaintiff's evidence 
showed as a matter of law that her decedent had been guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
What should be the Court's ruling upon the 
defendant's motion? 
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4. Big Time, Inc., owned residential property in the City 
of Lynchburg and it engaged A-Z Realty to act as rental agent for 
the property. A-Z Realty negotiated a lease with Tenant for one 
of these houses and as a result on December 28, 1968, Big Time, 
Inc., and l'enant executed the lease for the house therein described 
for a two-year term commencing January 1, 1969. The lease conta~ned 
inter alia the following provision; 
1118. Big Time agrees with and for the 
benefit of A-Z Realty that if Tenant, his 
successors or assigns shall, at any time during 
the term of this lease, purchase the premises, 
then in consideration of A-Z Realty consummating 
this lease, A-Z Realty shall receive, on the date 
the premises a.re transferred, a commission, based 
on the gross amount of the purchase price and at 
the rate prescribed as of the date of this lease 
by The Real Estate Board of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
This commission is in addition to any commission 
paid on the monthly rental of the premises." 
Big Time, Inc., acting solely on its own, negotiated the sale 
of the property to Tenant for $30,000 cash and the property was 
duly conveyed to Tenant on February 1, 1970. A-Z Realty demanded 
a commission or-$1,800 based upon the purchase price and the rate 
prescribed by The Real Estate Board of Lynchburg as of the date of 
the lease, which was 6%. Upon the refusal of Big Time, Inc., to pay 
the commission, A-Z Realty instituted an action at law against it 
:Ln the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg for the collection of 
commission of $1,800. The motion for judgment alleged the foregoing 
facts, and a copy of the lease and .a copy of the rate schedule of 
Real Estate Board of Lynchburg were attached to the motion as 
exhibits.· 
.·· Big Time, Inc., demurred to the motion for judgment on the 
:following grounds: 
(A} A-Z Realty was not a party to the lease and thus could 
maintain an action based on it; 
(B} There was no allegation in··the motion for judgment that 
plaintiff was the procuring ca.use of the sale; and · 
(C} The motion did not allege consideration for the promise 
pay a commission on the sale. 
How ought the court to rule on ea.ch ground 
of the demurrer? 
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5. After receiving bids for the construction and installation 
of elevators in an apartment building being erected for it in 
Roa.noke, Developer Corporation wrote Best Elevator Corporation on 
December 1, 1969, as follows: 
"Kindly consider this letter your 
order to proceed with drawings and fabrications 
of the three passenger elevators to be installed 
in our apartment building, 1500 South Jefferson 
Street, Roanoke, for the sum of $140,000, pending 
working out final details, such as delivery, 
completion, and complete elevator details by you 
to enable us to issue our formal purchase order." 
Thereafter, Best Elevator Corpora.tion proceeded with the draw-
ings a.nd fabrications for the three elevators. 
After some discussions concerning the plans and credit rating, 
Developer Corporation wrote Best Elevator Corporation on January 
15, 1970, as follows: 
"Since you have delayed so long in sub-
mitting final details as called for in our letter 
of December 1, we feel no obligation to proceed 
any further with you for the elevators for our 
building o II 
Upon receipt of this letter, Best Elevator Corporation stopped 
all work and asserted a claim against Developer Corporation for 
$44000 for expenses incurred up to the time it stopped work and ~l ,000 for loss of profits (10% of the original $140,000). 
What amount, if any, should Best Elevator 
Corporation be entitled to collect from 
Developer Corporation? 
6. Alb.ert, who owned Whiteacre in Bedford County, Virginia, 
nveyed a one-half undivided interest in it to his cousins, Burks 
)i Caldwell, "share and share alike, 11 and the other one-half un-
vidTrd interest to Henry Wells and :t:1a.ry Wells, "as husband and . fe. Subsequently, Burks, who was unmarried, died testate leaving 
-~ entire estate to his mother, Martha. Henry Wells died intestate 
l'Yived by Mary, his wife, and William, his son. 
State what interest, if any, (a) Caldwell, 
(b~ Martha, (c) Mary, and (d) William, have in 
Whiteacre. 
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7. Testator devised his farm in Rappahannock County, Virginia, 
to his daughter, Mary, for life, with the remainder in fee simple 
to Sam and William, the sons of Mary. Sam and William lived in 
California. They were desirous of selling the farm and, through 
a real estate agent in Virginia, negotiated a sale. Mary, however, 
was not willing to sell her life estate although the offer was 
deemed a good one. Sam and William instituted a partition suit ih 
the Circuit Court of Rappahannock County. Mary demurred to the 
bill of complaint on the ground that complainants were not entitled 
to partition. 
How should the Chancellor rule on the 
demurrer? 
8. Brutus drove an automobile into Tony's Garage and requested 
him to make certain repairs for which the charge was to be $100. 
Brutus never came back to get the automobile, and two months later 
Caesar saw it in Tony's Garage. He claimed it as his own and 
asserted that it had been stolen from him. Tony told Ca.esar that 
he could have the automobile upon paying for the repairs and 
storage. Caesar paid him, took the automobile, and disappeared. 
A week later True Owner appeared and proved that the automobile 
was his, that it had been stolen from him, and that neither Brutus 
nor Caesar had any rights "in :tt. 
Can True Owner successfully maintain an 
action against Tony for conversion? 
9. Sam Slicker, who had spent his entire life in Washington, 
• C., purchased a country home in Fauquier County, Virginia, 
onsisting of a dwelling, horse barn with box stalls, and 150 acres 
f land. The country home had been purchased at the insistence of 
licker's wife, who had always imagined that she would greatly 
Joy horseback riding, although she had never had the opportunity 
do so prior to the time of the purchase. After acquiring the 
c::>perty, Slicker was referred to Philip Trainer, who was engaged 
breeding and training riding horses. After advising Trainer 
at he needed two gentle horsea suitable for inexperienced riders, 
cker was shown two beautiful palominos. Slicker asked Trainer · 
.I?rice of the horses and was told that they could be purchased 
• .. ~500 each. Slicker advised Trainer that he would buy the 
ses and wrote Trainer a check for $1,000 and requested that the 
~es be delivered to his country place the following day. 
~ Trainer delivered the horses, they were found to be so spirit-
hat neither he nor his wife could mount them, and they could 
~e ridden by highly experienced riders. Slicker immediately 
ed ~rainer to come and get the horses and re~und him the 
0 which he had paid for them. Trainer refused to comply with 
.: .. · 
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Slicker's demand, stating that he had made no express warranty 
that Slicker and his wife would be able to ride the horses. 
Slicker consults you to ascertain what relief, if any, he has 
against Trainer. 
How would you advise him? 
10. Lucy Lovely was injured when the vehicle in which she was 
riding was struck by a vehicle driven by Ralph Reckless, which had 
just run through a red light. Shortly after the accident, Lucy 
made an appointment to see Attorney Blackstone to discuss her rights 
against Reckless. After a complete discussion of the facts of the 
accident and· her injuries, Blackstone inquired if Reckless was an 
insured driver. Lucy removed a slip of paper from her purse and 
read the name of Reckless' insurance carrier to Blackstone. 
Recognizing the name of the insurance carrier as one of his oldest 
and best retainer clients, Blackstone politely informed Lucy that 
he would be unable to represent her in her claim against Reckless; 
that he would not charge her for the consultation; and suggested 
that she seek other counsel. 
retained Attorney Marshall, who promptly filed an 
at. law against Reckless. Reckless referred the suit papers 
to his insurance carrier, who forwarded them to Blackstone with the 
request that he undertake the defense of the action against 
Reckless. 
May Blackstone ethically undertake the 
defense of Reckless in this action? 
